

Encountering and Understanding Suffering: The Need for Service Learning in Ethical Education

KATHERINE E. KIRBY

St. Michael's College

Abstract: In this article I claim that service-learning experiences, wherein students work directly with individuals in need—individuals from whom students can learn what they cannot learn elsewhere—are invaluable, and perhaps necessary, for any curriculum with an aim toward the development of ethical understanding, personal moral character and commitment, and/or conscientious citizenship, both local and global. My argument rests on Emmanuel Levinas's philosophical ethical theory that re-envisioning the ethical relation as arising out of revelation from the unique and precious Other, rather than reason and the rational determinations and conceptions of the ethical agent.

How can I make sense of the suffering of another person, if I have never experienced such suffering myself? How can we learn about the needs of those who suffer from people who have never experienced such suffering? For Emmanuel Levinas, French postmodern ethicist, the authority on whom I necessarily depend for any instruction about suffering can only be *the person who suffers herself*. In seeking to understand the suffering or need of another person, I seek to understand something about the world that is essentially off-limits to me. It is something that only she can possibly truly know. She is the expert on her suffering. I can try to imagine *how I would feel* in her situation. But I am not her. I can ask third parties if they can shed light on her experience, but they, too, are not privy to real understanding of her experience. The only access I have to her pain and need is *granted to me* through her willingness to *reveal* her suffering to me. Any understanding I might come to have is grounded in this revelation. She—the one who suffers—is the only truly reliable source of that information.¹

My claim in this article is that service-learning experiences in colleges and universities, wherein students work directly with individuals in need—individuals from whom students can learn what they cannot learn elsewhere—are invaluable, and perhaps necessary, for any cur-

riculum with an aim toward the development of ethical understanding, personal moral character and commitment, or conscientious citizenship—both local and global. Further, I believe that the same could be said in regard to high school education or even grade school or middle school education, as appropriate, of course, to age-level.

It is surely the case that courses in ethical education that focus on the theories of philosophers other than Levinas can integrate service learning with course material in a way that supports and illuminates such theories. It is not my claim that service learning would be in any way inappropriate or less than valuable in courses on virtue ethics or traditional deontology, for example. However, I would argue that such alternative ethical or moral theories seem to fail to *require* or *necessitate* engagement with the community through service learning. Some such theories suggest that ethical action arises out of understanding ascertained by the rational faculty that abstracts away from particulars to uncover a priori knowledge of what is right or good. Aristotle's theory, and those based upon it, though grounded in recognizing particulars, involve a rational determination of the good-for-all based upon knowledge of what is good for the self and the rational identification of the other as another self. These rational activities can be done, and done well, within the confines of a classroom.

Levinas, however, in his endeavor to radically call into question the privileging of knowledge over all else in the determination of ethical behavior, brings something new to the discussion of pedagogy. For Levinas, knowledge comes second to sociality—to the ethical relation—and is of a different structure altogether. Ethics *begins* with, and *requires*, *encounter* with the Other. The ethical agent comes to *understand* and make meaning of ethical engagement only in the *secondary*, rational moment of reflection upon such encounter. Thus, in an ethics course motivated and driven by Levinas's theory, service learning is more than just a useful tool. It is the necessary and sustained reorientation of students toward Others, which then motivates, informs, and enlivens reflective class reading and discussion.

I believe that our courses in ethical or moral education should not only teach students how to *conceive* of moral codes or laws or virtues. They should also help students to acknowledge the urgency of ethical action and foster a certain kind of concern and care on the part of students as ethical agents. As Patrick Fitzgerald suggests, in "Service-Learning and the Socially Responsible Ethics Class," reports on service learning from students "point us to a plausible way for us to justify our own social role. By giving their time to social causes university students have the power to help fulfill numerous social needs. By helping students develop socially responsible character traits the university ethics professor is uniquely positioned to provide

for an important social need—the moral development of members of society.”² We have a social responsibility—an ethical responsibility—to use our expertise to cultivate ethical or moral development and social responsibility in our students.

I will argue that there are roughly four steps involved in fulfilling ethical responsibility, and I will show that the grounding of these four steps properly lies in Levinas’s articulation of the ethical relation between self and Other.³ These steps will be the following:

1. Step One—I must seek the most reliable sources of information. In ethics, the most reliable source of information regarding need is the one who needs.
2. Step Two—I must suspend my ideas, goals, etc., and the egoism of believing that I can know without experience. (This is a *suspension*, not necessarily a dismissal of my beliefs.)
3. Step Three—I must listen to the “Other,” being receptive to what she wants to reveal.
4. Step Four—I must understand, judge, decide, and act, while always being sure to check back in with the person I serve so that I can revise my understanding or actions, as needed.

These four steps of ethical responsibility, I argue, are best learned through the *practice* of serving others and the careful secondary reflection upon experience that can happen in a classroom in which dialogue is likewise grounded upon respect for “Others.”

In addition to an examination of Levinas’s theory, I will refer to four important articles on service learning that have appeared in *Teaching Philosophy*,⁴ and I will use my own service-learning course, entitled “Otherness and Marginalization: Levinas and the Alienated,” as a concrete example of the way in which Levinas’s theory of ethical transformation can be enlivened through ethical engagement. There is both a domestic service-learning experience in this course during the regular semester and an optional international service-learning trip for two weeks at the end of the term. I have taken students to Peru and to Guyana on separate occasions. In both the domestic and international components, students spend time with individuals who face marginalization on the basis of their “otherness.” Students work in the local community with senior citizens living at a nearby low-income nursing home, and they work abroad with senior citizens, children at an orphanage or school, and individuals suffering from either Hansen’s Disease (leprosy) or severe mental and physical disability, depending on the international location. In this paper, I will most often call upon the example of the work my students do with senior citizens, both local and abroad. I will also discuss the experience of working with the ill.

The purpose of my students' work is to attend to the needs of individuals at our various sites, spending time with them and listening to them. The specific practical service tasks are determined through this interaction with an Other. The purpose of the course is two-fold. We seek to examine the way in which people so often respond to "otherness" with fear, apprehension, and exclusion, if not violence. And we then consider Levinas's alternative notion of "Otherness," as the uniqueness and preciousness of each individual, which ought to inspire awe and respect and the embrace of difference.

*Step One—Finding the Most Reliable Source:
The Other and the Mystery of the "Face"*

Ethical theorists in philosophy prior to the work of Emmanuel Levinas ground ethical understanding, guidelines for behavior, and moral rules and laws in what they take to be the supreme faculty of the human being—Reason. In general, they argue that the ethical agent can know the good or the right through a purely rational examination. In other words, the most reliable source of information is the carefully critical, contemplative self. According to Aristotle's "doctrine of the Mean," once one understands the nature of the character trait that lies between excess and deficiency, one knows what it means to be virtuous. Courage, for example, is the mean between the vices of cowardice and foolish bravado.⁵ We then must only apply such virtuous character to our experiences with the other person, who, for Aristotle, deserves such ethical treatment because I can rationally identify her as another self—my alter-ego, if you will. For Kant, my own reason is sufficient to lead me to an understanding of the universal moral law, which necessarily applies to all people, at all times, and under all circumstances. His formulations of the "Categorical Imperative" allow the agent to rationally decide how she should act without any reference to the particularities of the situation she is experiencing. The only reliable source I need is myself. And for John Stuart Mill, ethical action comes down to a simple (or sometimes complex) utilitarian calculus that I perform, thoroughly logical and rational in nature. The ethical agent must simply weigh the quality and quantity of goods versus the quality and quantity of harm, and she will know how to act.

Recognizing this rationalistic tendency within the history of philosophical ethics (and philosophy in general), wherein the ethical agent is capable of *autonomously* determining what is right or good, Levinas seeks to expose more than just the inadequacy of such rational formulation of universal rules and laws or the rational determination of "the good." He also exposes the *danger* in the belief that the rational agent can come to fully understand the needs of the Other without real

reference to the Other herself, in her uniqueness and particularity. For him, entering into relation with the Other with the assumption that I already know what is good for her, prior to really listening to her, is the first ethical violation, for it reduces her to my conceptions and categories. Levinas, therefore, proposes an alternative understanding of the relation with the Other, wherein *the Other* is acknowledged to be the most reliable source of information.

Rather than conceiving of the Other as simply another self, an alter-ego, a being who is the same as me and thus seeks the same goods that I seek, Levinas speaks of the Other as an unfathomable mystery to me. She is radically different from me—unique in the world—and encounter with her is an encounter with something beyond my understanding. In *Existence and Existents*, Levinas explains, “[t]he Other as other is not only an *alter-ego*. He is what I am not: he is the weak one whereas I am the strong one; he is the poor one, ‘the widow and the orphan.’ . . . Or else the other is the stranger, the enemy and the powerful one. What is essential is that he has these qualities by virtue of his very alterity.”⁶ No matter how well I come to understand, or identify with, another person, there will always be something that eludes me. I never have access to her mind or her heart in the way that she does. Her experience of the world (both good and bad) is forever beyond my intellectual or emotional reach. This is why Levinas speaks of the Other as the “Face,” the “Transcendent,” and even the “Divine.”⁷

In *Totality and Infinity*, he says, “[t]he way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the *idea of the other in me*, we here name the face. This *mode* does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its *ideatum*—the adequate idea.”⁸ The Other is far more than I could possibly conceive through my rational endeavor to understand. Later in that same work, he again articulates the transcendence of the Other, explaining that “[r]evelation is discourse. . . . But this relationship is as distant from objectification as from participation. To hear the divine word does not amount to knowing an object; it is to be in relation with a substance overflowing its own idea in me, overflowing what Descartes calls its ‘objective existence.’”⁹ The Other transcends, escapes, overflows my ability to comprehend. There is something about the Other that will always remain a mystery to me.

How, then, can I ever know what is good for the Other, what she needs, and how I might help alleviate her suffering? I am not able to acquire such understanding on my own, for I can only ever know *my own* suffering and need. Who, then, is the most reliable source of information regarding the Other’s need? Only the Other herself can

be such an authority on her suffering. Can students, then, learn what it means to be ethical by reading the theories of so-called “expert” theorists? Or must they learn from those who suffer?

During the first three weeks or so of my “Otherness and Marginalization” course, we read and discuss various writings by, or about, individuals who face marginalization or violence on the basis of their “otherness”—the poor, the elderly, the ill, the foreign. My purpose in beginning with these readings is quite similar to the purpose Stephen L. Esquith explains in “War, Political Violence, and Service Learning.” He has his students read the narratives of individuals living through war, because, as he explains, “I . . . wanted students to see how war-time experiences vary dramatically depending upon whether one is a soldier, a munitions worker, a nurse, a refugee, a protester, or even a troubled dissembler.”¹⁰ I want my students to understand the same phenomena, but to an even greater degree. I want them to realize that *each individual* has his or her own unique experience of marginalization. It is not enough to differentiate between refugees and soldiers, or nurses and laborers. Even within these categories, experiences vary dramatically.

Despite my intention, however, as we discuss these texts, students tend to develop a sense of rational identification with the suffering individuals whose stories are told. They often become angry about the injustice they find within these stories, and they often comment that they are glad that they now *understand* their plight more deeply than they had before. Already, even before face-to-face encounter with their community partners, they begin to see the necessity of opening themselves to the words of others—their stories and testimonies, or those of witnesses—in order to come to better understanding. And yet, the temptation to identify and thematize is strong and hard to resist.

As an illustration of this temptation to identify and categorize, the moment that we begin discussing the service work we will be doing, my students start planning activities that they are *sure* the senior citizens would enjoy doing. They think about their own grandparents and what they might like to do. They imagine the limitations of some of the seniors and how that would affect any activities they have in mind. They search their previous knowledge and what they have gleaned from the readings to decide how they will interact with the seniors. They are stuck in the mode of identification, wherein they relate their senior partners to others they know or themselves.

In her article, “Teaching Philosophy Outside the Classroom: One Alternative to Service Learning,” Sarah K. Donovan highlights the problem of over-identification, giving the following example:

[O]ne White American student claimed that after visiting Harlem he felt that he had walked in the shoes of a Black American. While the student’s asser-

tion was probably an innocent, albeit overly zealous, attempt to indicate that he had benefited from the experience, it was also an oversimplification of what it would take for a privileged White American to truly understand the experience of an underprivileged person of color.¹¹

I find a similar oversimplified over-identification within my students' first attempts to prepare themselves for their service. They seem to believe that they can have knowledge of what the seniors will expect, want, or enjoy, prior to any interaction. They remain in the rational moment while such thinking and planning is going on. Consequently, they tend to become extremely uncomfortable when I tell them that we will start not with planning activities, but with simply walking the halls at the nursing home, stopping in to meet any seniors who would like to meet us.¹² We will wait to make our plans until we get to know the seniors.

By the time our service work begins, we have started to examine Levinas's theory. We have considered his notion of the Other, as described above, as unique and resistant to thematization.¹³ The class has discussed the notion of the other as radically Other, beyond my understanding, and commanding as the moral authority and source of ethical instruction. Thus, though many students are still quite uncomfortable embarking on the initial face-to-face encounters, most approach the experience with the conviction that the Other has something incredibly valuable to reveal or teach. Though it is no easy task, I encourage my students to avoid making generalizations as they engage in their initial meetings, or at least to recognize them when they are made and question their adequacy. This acknowledgment of the Other as beyond autonomous, rational conceptualization necessarily also involves, on the part of each student, an acknowledgement of his or her own limits.

*Step Two—The Suspension of the Self:
The Power of the “I” and the Need for Self-Critique*

Not only is my power to comprehend inadequate for grasping the Other, but the intent to do so is an ethical violation, for it seeks to transform the unknown into the known—to reduce this mysterious, transcendent Other to a being that I can thematize, categorize, and assimilate into my stockpile of knowledge. Thus, Step Two in the cultivation of ethical responsibility requires the bracketing of my a priori conceptions and judgments, and a suspension of my egoism. Levinas, throughout his body of work, describes the self—the “I”—as creating for itself a world—the world of the “Same” as he calls it. In *Totality and Infinity*, he explains, “[t]he way of the I against the ‘other’ of the world consists in sojourning, in identifying oneself by existing here at home with oneself. . . . It finds in the world a site . . . and a home. . . . Dwelling

is the very mode of maintaining oneself . . . a site where I can, where, dependent on a reality that is other, I am, despite this dependence or thanks to it, free. . . . [E]verything belongs to me.”¹⁴ The egoistic I wanders through the world transforming the unknown that it encounters into pieces of knowledge. I—the agent—do this by drawing upon the ideas and understandings I already have, identifying or distinguishing new objects with or from that prior knowledge, and locking that new object down into a concept, category, or theme. This process is what enables me to understand the world, my place in it, and how I might manipulate and use the world for the purpose of fulfilling my aims and goals. None of this is a bad thing. In fact, this is how we survive and care for ourselves physically, work and contribute our talents to the world, and even enjoy the thrills of discovery, insight, and invention.

However, this same process, when utilized in the encounter with another person, for Levinas, both misses the mark (that is, fails to actually capture the other’s Otherness) and seeks to reduce this ever-elusive mystery to nothing more than one of my pieces of knowledge. Levinas explains this in *Ethics and Infinity*, saying the following:

[i]n what concerns *knowledge*: it is by essence a relation with what one equals and includes, with that whose alterity one suspends, with what becomes immanent, because it is to my measure and my scale. I think of Descartes, who said that the *cogito* can give itself the sun and the sky; the only thing it cannot give itself is the idea of the Infinite. Knowledge is always an adequation between thought and what it thinks. There is in knowledge . . . an impossibility of escaping the self; hence *sociality* cannot have the same structure as knowledge.¹⁵

One does not become moral by merely gaining knowledge. Sociality is something more than the adequation between the Other and my idea of her. Levinas goes on to say that knowledge “does not put us in communion with the truly other; it does not take the place of sociality; it is still always a solitude.”¹⁶ Thus, in order to have a genuine encounter with the Other, I must suspend these activities of categorization, adequation, and assimilation. It is true that I cannot stop thinking and forming ideas, but I must bracket these, in a sense. I must allow my power and ability to conceptualize to be called into question and exposed as inadequate and reductive. Practically speaking, though my mind may make judgments upon first encountering the homeless stranger, my first ethical responsibility is to recognize and suspend those judgments and seek sociality with the stranger.

Can students learn what it means to be ethical by merely assimilating the ideas and proposals of ethical theorists into their bank of knowledge? Can they simply read about the suffering of Others and “identify” with their plight? Or must there be a moment in which they suspend their “service goals” and what they think they know about the

Other's suffering and seek face-to-face relationships with Others, free of prejudices (or pre-judgments) and egoistic endeavor?

In class, after discussing Levinas's notion of the Other's uniqueness, we turn to his explanation of the necessity of self-critique and the suspension of the priority given to the self, as I have just described. Through this reading and discussion, the problem of the self's orientation and the dangerous privileging of rationality become clear, in theory. As we begin our service work, these ideas that have been considered in the abstract find illustration in the concrete experience of encounter. As Donovan says, "experiential learning . . . concretizes abstract concepts."¹⁷ In agreement, H. M. Geibel, in "In Defense of Service Learning," defends the "relevance of service learning to philosophy courses," saying the following:

[T]he abstract nature of philosophy that to many instructors seems to militate *against* service learning can actually be used to present an argument *for* the practice. Because philosophical arguments tend to be abstract, some students have difficulty understanding them and applying them to "real life" situations. A concrete experience demonstrating an application of a philosophical concept or theory often may be helpful in such situations but is difficult to achieve in a classroom.¹⁸

For Levinas, the concrete experience of service learning is not merely "helpful in such situations," but is actually *necessary*. Knowledge of the ethical relation is *grounded upon* the relation itself. Thus, knowledge, or understanding, of ethics *requires* the lived experience of ethical engagement.

I believe that the success of the initial meeting, and those that follow, between my students and their senior partners depends upon two things. First is the recognition of the other as Other, as described in Step One. This very recognition, though, involves a complementary recognition of the self—the ethical agent—as limited. Many students initially express that they "don't know how to talk to old people." They offer suggestions of planning a bingo event or an art project or some other form of entertainment for the seniors as a group. Inevitably, though, as we discuss what Levinas might say about the plans they are making, someone in the class will ask, "But how do we know if they *want* to play bingo?" And here we have the Levinasian point: the only way to know the Other's longings, needs, desires, etc. is to stop making plans, stop trying to predict what "seniors" as a category would enjoy, and stop egoistically believing that you know what they need or want prior to engaging in conversation with individuals.

Further discussion reveals that the category of "seniors" itself reduces each individual to simply one of a certain kind, whom I understand by application of that category. Students thus realize that they cannot plan ahead of time. They must begin not with goals and judg-

ments and plans of their own design, but with a suspension of these very things, in order to allow each senior to reveal his or her wishes, ideas, and needs. Levinas explains the necessary orientation of the ethical agent, saying, “[a] being *receiving* the idea of Infinity, *receiving* since it cannot derive it from itself, is a being taught in a non-maieutic fashion, a being whose very being consists in this incessant reception of teaching, in this incessant overflowing of self.”¹⁹ Such receptivity is only possible when a person’s goals and projects and plans have been suspended. Practically speaking, my students must offer themselves in conversation before anything else.

Donovan speaks of a kind of “dissonance” experienced by students, and I believe that her notion is quite similar to what Levinas intends.²⁰ She describes the process of self-examination sparked by experiences her students had in Harlem, saying “[t]he experience further initiated an experience of dissonance in our students between what they thought they knew and reality.”²¹ I believe that Levinas’s notion of critique necessarily involves precisely the kind of dissonance Donovan describes. Students realize that, in Levinasian terms, their knowledge of the other (which takes the form of stereotypes, generalizations, and the reduction of particulars to comprehensive ideas) fails to match, or capture, the reality of the Other. Or, as Donovan says, in discussing Patrick Hurley’s *A Concise Introduction to Logic*, students should learn that “stereotypes are based on hasty generalizations” and “stereotypes [indicate] illogical, poor inductive reasoning and/or intellectual laziness.”²² Students must be encouraged to resist such intellectual laziness, but Levinas would suggest that the way to do that is not to merely *improve* the quality of inductive reasoning, but to suspend the rational endeavor of comprehensive knowing altogether. Laziness is often most clearly manifested as an unwillingness to spend time in careful critique and examination of one’s ideas.

Esquith seems to agree with this idea, in that he calls into question the power and sufficiency of inward contemplation of texts. He rightly acknowledges that such objective and “dispassionate” examination of texts is insufficient, in that, “[a]s powerful as this discursive strategy can be for academics who are accustomed to this kind of inner dialogue, it wasn’t going to get my students to think about how the violence of war might affect them as individuals.”²³ Levinas would certainly take issue with the underlying project of identification between the self and Other that is implicit in Esquith’s intention, as stated here. However, he would support the notion that abstract, objective contemplation is inadequate.

Alongside this experience of intellectual dissonance that calls for self-critique, we find a parallel experience of emotional unsettling. Fitzgerald highlights this emotional challenge. In describing his stu-

dents work in a nursing home, he cites student responses and concludes that “the reason that service-learning can sometimes be such a powerful educational tool is that it opens the students up to such profoundly challenging experiences as befriending a dying patient.”²⁴ Such experiences can be incredibly “emotionally taxing,” because they draw the student out of her sphere of comfort and require that she dwell in the moment of facing the unknown.²⁵

During one experience in Guyana, a student spent the afternoon dressing the fly-covered open wounds of an elderly woman who could not speak. That evening, during reflection, the student spoke of his experience as a powerful reorientation away from his pre-med, objective-science background toward a real emotional connection with this woman, as she looked at him and touched him while he helped her. The next afternoon, he learned that she had passed away a few hours after their encounter. He, quite emotionally, revealed how he felt and thought about the encounter, saying that she expressed such gratitude for his care even without saying a word, and it was as if she was able to pass away having been shown the respect, openness, and loving attention she deserved. As Levinas would suggest, there could be no in-class, text-based experience that exposes an individual to the reality of engagement with the Other the way this experience did.

Step Three—Listening to the Other: Revelation, Desire, and Welcome

The question now arises as to *how* it is that the Other reveals herself as resisting the kind of assimilation described above. Levinas argues that, in the first moment of encounter with the Other, a command is issued to the I as the ethical agent. As he explains, “[t]he first word of the face is the ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ It is an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me. However, at the same time, the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor one for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all. And me, whoever I may be, but as a ‘first person,’ I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call.”²⁶ When Levinas says that the Other commands me to refrain from killing her, this includes the murderous endeavor to snuff out that which is unknown—to rationally assimilate the Other into the Same. In the moment that I first encounter the Other, this commandment has already been issued—a commandment to act in a way that does not harm the vulnerable Other.

At the same time that she commands me, she reveals her vulnerability, and invites me into a non-violent, peaceful relation with her. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas says, “[t]he absolute experience is not disclosure but revelation: a coinciding of the expressed with him

who expresses, which is the privileged manifestation of the Other, the manifestation of a face over and beyond form.”²⁷ In practical terms, the address of the homeless stranger does several things: (1) it commands that I not do violence to her or reduce her to my preconceptions; (2) it exposes her suffering and reveals her need to me; and (3) it invites me into dialogue and relation with her. I am called to halt my assimilation and be open to what she has to reveal. Step Three in the cultivation of ethical responsibility requires that I listen to the Other, and be receptive to her. I must halt my *rational* endeavor and open myself to *revelation*.

The phenomenon that plays counterpart to this command and revelation issued forth from the Other is what Levinas calls Metaphysical Desire on the part of the I. This Desire is not the same as needing the Other, but is rather a yearning to be in contact with the transcendent. It is a kind of desire that cannot be satisfied, nor does it seek satisfaction or fulfillment. According to Levinas, in *Totality and Infinity*, “[t]he metaphysical desire has another intention; it desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like Goodness—the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it.”²⁸ I would characterize this Desire as the yearning and adoration that comes with the discovery of the uniqueness and preciousness of the Other. The encounter with alterity holds the power to inspire me, to awaken awe at the mystery of that which I can never understand. In comparing his idea of the infinite Other with Descartes’ idea of the Infinite (God), in *Ethics and Infinity*, Levinas says, “I am thinking here of the *astonishment* at this disproportion.”²⁹ As the one approached and addressed by the transcendent Other, I cannot help but be intrigued, not in the sense of wanting to *grasp* the unknown and lock it down into knowledge, but in the sense of yearning for the teaching that only the Other can provide.

This Desire will then lead me to *listen* to the Other *as Other*—the stranger, as herself. I will be compelled to give her my attention and open myself to receiving the message she wishes to reveal to me. For Levinas, this response is referred to as the “Welcome.” As he says, “responsibility then only amounts to responding . . . ‘Here I am.’”³⁰ These words are not the declaration of an all-powerful agent announcing her presence. Rather, they are the words that express openness and a willingness to help or to serve. As Levinas explains, “[t]o approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression. . . . It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught.”³¹ When I welcome the Other, my attention and my concern become oriented toward her as I receive what she reveals to me.

I cannot truly learn what the Other needs without paying attention to her address, without desiring to engage with her in a non-violent

way, without really *wanting* to have contact with her, and without opening myself to listen to her. Neither can students come to understand the necessity of really listening to those who need our attention and service, without having any contact with Others in need. I would suggest that they cannot really feel called or compelled to engagement by reading abstract theories and discussing obligation without the *experience* of feeling the pull of responsibility for the well-being of actual individuals.

I would argue, in addition, that the development of ethical sensibility is not primarily a matter of character development or habituation. Surely, these things may develop over the course of each student's lifetime. However, I am skeptical of the idea that such character development is possible in a semester, because such development takes great time. I am also concerned that, if and when character development becomes the intention and focus of service, we may lose the transformative quality of such experiences. Fitzgerald argues in support of the idea that service learning enables such character development, saying, "[p]art of the promise of service-learning is that it positively affects the moral character of students by exposing them to transformative experiences and by habituating them in moral behavior."³² He later says, "[s]ome students reported generally becoming a 'better person' while others listed the development of specific virtues such as patience, open-mindedness, compassion, commitment, and fortitude."³³ I would not argue that any of this is necessarily bad. The development of moral virtues is certainly very important. But I worry, as Levinas would, that the *endeavor* to "become a better person," or to cultivate one's own character, prohibits the kind of radical reorientation toward the Other that is so important in ethical engagement. My own self-cultivation is one of the goals that must be suspended during Step Two.

Geibel partially supports my assessment, claiming, "[t]he point of service learning is not to compel moral virtue."³⁴ However, the remainder of that sentence—"but to teach students about concepts and their applications"—seems far too rationalistic. Is it enough to introduce students to concepts and then have them apply, or *impose*, those concepts onto their service experiences? Levinas would suggest a reversal, as I will show in Step Four. Experience precedes conceptualization.

The notion of habituation is similarly problematic from a Levinasian perspective, because it implies that one can learn how to encounter an Other through a lifetime of encountering *other* Others, as if she is the same as the other people I have known. For Levinas, this is a real reduction of the Other to the concepts and habits created prior to encounter. If the Other is radically unique, as Levinas argues, then no amount of habituation, or the application of generalized virtues, will be adequate for ethical orientation. For him, the most important

element of the ethical encounter is the revelation of the Face and the welcome of the Other. Esquith's students indicated the importance of this moment, as he explains, saying, "[a]lmost all of them felt some personal connection to their community volunteer, and said that *just meeting someone* with this kind of story to tell and helping them tell it was important."³⁵ The meeting—the encounter, or engagement—must be recognized as the most important moment of ethical development for the student. It provides the essential condition for the later possibility of the emergence of virtuous character.

During the domestic service-learning component of my course, students begin their relationships with their senior partners by engaging in simple conversation. The seniors at St. Joseph's Home for the Aged are able to engage with my students in a way that, in my view, opens up the possibility for students to welcome their partners' revelations and experience what it means to desire encounter with the Other. When I began teaching the class, in an effort to stay true to Levinasian receptivity, I allowed the format of their interactions to be entirely determined by my students and their senior partners. Often, students had a lot of difficulty for the first several visits, and I realized that they would benefit from being given a small amount of direction.

The main tool I will use in the future to help my students begin to accomplish Step Three is storytelling, which students seem to *eventually* appreciate, even without direction from me. The major project for the semester will be a gathering of life stories or memoirs and the creation of a unique and personalized format for the expression of those stories. I like the Diversity Project that Geibel describes, wherein students "[record] the oral history of an elderly person."³⁶ However, while Geibel's project resulted in the majority of students concluding that "there is an essential human nature," it is my hope that my students will come to acknowledge the radical *alterity* of their senior partners. While students will certainly pose questions about the life their senior partner has lived thus far, I will strongly encourage them to allow their senior partner to reveal what she chooses. This gives the senior the freedom to select what she feels is important—to *reveal* herself.

The student should "welcome" the senior, listening attentively and carefully, and with interest. My hope is that Levinasian Desire is cultivated in each student, wherein she becomes fascinated and inspired by her senior partner, and she looks forward to engagement. Of course, this cannot be a guaranteed result. There will be students who do not find themselves so moved by their conversations. However, on the whole, students in the past have come to care very deeply for their senior partners, and many do find the stories and life experiences that are shared to be interesting and even inspiring.

The international service-learning component requires a bit less intervention and direction on my part, for two reasons. The first is that students have spent the previous semester coming to value storytelling as an avenue for revelation. It is less difficult for them to become engaged with seniors once they have learned a way of opening up conversation and inviting revelation. The second reason why less structure is needed is that students are automatically more interested and curious about the lives of people from radically different nations or backgrounds. I saw a real wonder and Desire for engagement among my students when they found themselves in a “foreign” country working with people who have backgrounds so radically different from their own.

Of course, for Levinas, such practical, superficial differences are not what comprise the transcendent “Otherness” of the individual. Thus, it is very important for me to remind my students not to impose categories on individuals they encounter. Levinas explains that “[t]he alterity of the Other does not depend on any quality that would distinguish him from me, for a distinction of this nature would precisely imply between us that community of genus which already nullifies alterity.”³⁷ The individual, it must be remembered, is not “Other” just because she is Guyanese or Peruvian—a “quality that would distinguish [her] from me.” When students remember this, they are able to refocus and approach each individual as a *Levinasian* Other, without their enthusiasm and curiosity diminishing at all. The storytelling occurs as a very natural activity in Guyana and Peru, because the individuals with whom we work want to reveal to us their country, their history, and their personal struggles and victories. And my students are always fascinated.

Of course, there is also inevitable apprehension and discomfort in certain settings, which makes open-hearted welcoming difficult. In Guyana, we spend time with individuals suffering from the effects of Hansen’s disease, more commonly known as leprosy. Though all of the patients have been cured, and are no longer contagious, and my students understand this, it is often very difficult, initially, for them to overcome their concerns for their own safety and health. This fear, however, is usually short-lived. Upon meeting the individuals at Mahaica Leprosy Residence, and seeing the physical conditions of neglect and deterioration in which they live, students’ compassion dispels their fear. Overwhelmed by what they are witnessing, as is often reported after leaving the site, students tend to let go of their preconceived notions and they listen. They realize that they had completely inadequate understanding prior to this encounter.

The same phenomenon, wherein students find their knowledge to be inadequate and they open themselves to revelation, occurs in Lima,

when we visit La Hogar de Paz, the home for elderly and disabled men and severely disabled, abandoned street children, run by the Sisters of Charity. Here, once again, students find that what they thought they knew was inadequate. What is most interesting to me at this site is that the children with whom we work cannot speak. During the time we worked there this past May, we spent the afternoon feeding them lunch, each student feeding one severely disabled teen. And though no conversation occurred, all of my students found the experience to be profoundly moving. They realized that the revelation that Levinas describes occurs not only through spoken language, but also through touch and the non-verbal expression of the eyes and the body. They understood what Levinas means when he says, “Infinity presents itself as a face in the ethical resistance that paralyses my powers and from the depths of defenceless eyes rises firm and absolute in its nudity and destitution. The comprehension of this destitution and his hunger establishes the very proximity of the other.”³⁸ He continues, explaining that “[t]he being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so precisely by appealing to me with its destitution and nudity—its hunger—without my being able to be deaf to that appeal.”³⁹ We were all called to *listen* to the Other—to give our full attention and our care, even when this could not be verbally requested. To do otherwise would have meant turning away from the silent appeal of the defenseless Other.

Step Four—Reason & Revision:

Responsible Understanding, Judging, Deciding, and Acting

A common concern for many scholars and readers of Levinas is that the ethical relation and obligation to suspend one’s rational activities leaves the ethical agent in a state of paralysis. If understanding is thematization, and judgment results in assimilation and reduction, then how can one attempt to fulfill the needs of the Other without doing violence to her? This objection, though, seems to me to be a misunderstanding of Levinas’s theory. In *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas discusses the transition from the ethical moment to rational understanding using the terms, the “Saying” and the “Said,” where the Saying is the address and revelation of the Other, and the Said is the *content* of the address which can be thematized and understood. The Saying is the command, plea, invitation of the Other and also my response of opening myself to revelation. In contrast, as Levinas tells us, the Said is the “putting together of structures which make possible justice and the ‘I think.’ The said arises in the saying. . . . Clarity occurs, and thought aims at themes. But all that is in function of a prior signification proper to saying.”⁴⁰ Rationality is ever-present in the encounter with the Other, and it functions in drawing the Said out of the Saying. In other words,

rationality translates the Saying into that which can be understood. Here, we find the opportunity for Step Four of the cultivation of ethical or moral responsibility—careful understanding, reflection, judgment, decision, and action that *always returns* to the ethical moment for clarification and revision.

In Levinas's work, as I have shown, the ethical moment is the face-to-face encounter wherein I devote my full concern and attention to the Other. However, the "third," he says, is ever-present. There are two complimentary ways of understanding Levinas's notion of the "third" that I think are particularly helpful in understanding the proper role of reason in both practical decision-making and philosophical reflection. First, while I am engaged in the ethical encounter with the Other, an *other* Other approaches—the actual third person comes into view. This idea of the third, for Levinas, reveals that I am obligated not only to one Other at a time, but that my ethical attention is always pulled in multiple directions. I am obligated to welcome all Others. As Levinas explains, "with the appearance of the third—the third must also have a face. . . . I am led to compare faces, to compare the two people. Which is a terrible task. It is entirely different from speaking to the face. To compare them is to place them in the same genre."⁴¹ While my ethical obligation in the face-to-face encounter is infinite, it is also impossible, because I find that I must compromise and divide my concern among many.

Out of this acknowledgment of the need to "compare faces," emerges the concern for justice, for Levinas, as the equitable balancing of obligations and evenhanded fulfillment of rights. He says, in *Ethics and Infinity*, "[t]he interpersonal relation I establish with the Other, I must also establish with other men, there is thus a necessity to moderate this privilege of the Other; from whence comes justice."⁴² It is a departure from the pure ethical encounter, and it necessarily involves rational understanding and calculation, as well as the creation of just institutions and formalized rules and laws. The emergence of the third person draws me out of the purely ethical relationship, which is "*modified* by the fact that there is justice, and that, with justice, there is a state, and as citizens we are equal."⁴³ But the Levinasian point is that such a concern for justice and equality is essential *because* of my ethical responsibility for *individuals*. The next sentence in the above quote from *Ethics and Infinity* says, "Justice, exercised through institutions, which are inevitable, must always be held in check by the initial interpersonal relation."⁴⁴ Justice arises out of, and in service to, the ethical relation.

The second way of interpreting the Levinasian "third" explains *how* I move from the ethical relation into a position from which I can weigh and compare my obligations and seek justice and equality. This

interpretation of the notion of the “third” places the I—the self—within the philosophical endeavor. Levinas says, “[j]ustice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneity, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a system.”⁴⁵ I leave the first-person perspective I experience in ethical encounter, and I take on the “third-person” perspective. I abstract away from the encounter itself in order to take an objective god’s-eye-view, so to speak. From this perspective, I seek to understand the encounter rationally. I make sense of what the Other has said and what I can do for her. I recognize myself as an Other to the Other, deserving of a certain kind of treatment. And I recognize the many possible conflicting obligations that must be rationally weighed.

I am able to see the need for justice described above, because I have stepped away from the closed world of the interpersonal face-to-face relation between me and the Other. This stepping away, of course, is conceptual. Levinas explains that “justice itself is born of charity. They can seem alien when they are presented as successive stages; in reality, they are inseparable and simultaneous.”⁴⁶ It is not that one activity—engagement in the ethical relation—occurs, and then later the other activity—rational understanding and the search for justice—occurs. “Inseparable and simultaneous” to the ethical moment, lies the rational attempt to make sense out of the experience. This is the movement of conceptualization, understanding, and knowledge.

The encounter with the Other surely leads to thematization, but the point is that to understand *responsibly*, I must always keep in mind that my ideas and concepts never fully capture the revelation of the Other, and that all of my thinking and acting must always be done in service to her. Conceptualizing the Other and her needs is *always* a reduction, even if a necessary one. It is needed if I am to understand, judge how to best act, decide on a course of action, and then act. But I must always remember the Saying. In *Otherwise Than Being*, Levinas explains that “[t]he plot of the saying that is absorbed in the said is not exhausted in this manifestation. It imprints its trace on the thematization itself. . . . Being . . . is, to be sure, a theme, but it makes essence resound without entirely deadening the echo of the saying that bears it and brings it to light.”⁴⁷ Any *understanding* of the Other depends upon *contact* with her—the contact possible in the Saying, which remains always hidden just behind the Said. Responsibility, then, requires a “dethematization of the said.”⁴⁸ Remembering the Saying means that I am always open to critique, and revision of my ideas and judgments will always be necessary. I must always check back in with the Other—return to the ethical moment of openness to revelation—to make sure that the ideas I create and the judgments I make are responsible ones.

Without a constant return to the suffering Other for revelation and instruction, I can never be sure that the ethical principles I hold will meet her real needs, or the judgments I make regarding right and wrong are accurate. I cannot know that the decisions I make regarding how best to act will actually capture the most effective methods of service. Neither can students really understand the consequences of their ideas, judgments, decisions, and actions without having first-hand experience of the way in which these affect the individuals served by them. They cannot test or rigorously critique their ideas and theories about what is right and wrong, and revise them where necessary, without making reference to actual individuals.

I conceive of my course as holding two very related, equally important, and yet structurally different components. One is the engagement in sociality through ethical encounter, which I have described above in the first three Steps. The other is serious, critical philosophical reflection upon such engagement—the movement of the “third,” as Levinas describes, or the drawing out of the Said from the Saying. What happens in the classroom is predominantly the latter component. Together, in dialogue, we seek to understand what is important about the ethical relation—what motivates it, sustains it, and requires it. This is a philosophy course, after all, and it therefore consists of the search for knowledge. Donovan points out that the most important tasks of the educator are to challenge oversimplifications, encourage students to question assumptions, and provide the opportunity for revision of ideas and concepts.⁴⁹ I completely agree that fulfilling these tasks is the greatest responsibility the educator has, as educator. I want my students to come away from class with new questions and insights. I want them to be able to adopt the theoretical stance of analysis, critique, and creative thinking.

Geibel cites several student responses that reveal the kind of serious reflection and insight that is possible thanks to service-learning experiences in a course. One student “questioned [his] overall intentions,” which, I believe, shows the way in which Step Four reinforces Step Two—self-critique and the suspension of the I’s endeavors. Geibel’s interpretation of such a student response is a bit different from mine, though. Geibel says, “[d]irected reflection on a relevant service experience outside the classroom, together with a spirit of Socratic inquiry, can help students to unearth and resolve contradictions and tensions in their own thinking about the issue under discussion.”⁵⁰ From a Levinasian perspective, while reflection should certainly involve the endeavor to make sense out of ethical experience, it should also acknowledge, and remember, that tensions cannot be resolved entirely, and that any understanding or knowledge reached about the Other, and my relation to her, is incomplete.

I have no doubt that my students engage in a significant amount of solitary reflection upon their experiences of service, even during and immediately following their engagements with their senior partners. Fruitful individual contemplation of such experience comes more naturally to some students than others, though, so it is important that reflection be modeled in the classroom and directed through assignments. Thus, students are required to keep a journal with their own ideas and writings based on prompts that I give them. Fitzgerald captures the essence of what, I believe, makes a good journal assignment, when he explains his own use of such. He says, “[s]tudents were expected to do three things in their journals: to describe what they did during their service, to describe the feelings they had about what they were doing, and finally to generalize about their experiences. In their generalizations students were encouraged to link their service experiences to concepts discussed in class.”⁵¹ I utilize a very similar structure for journals, offering “Guiding Questions” to lead students toward a clearer contemplation of course concepts than they might be able to do on their own. These are very open-ended, so as not to completely impose my own ideas of what is important upon my students’ reflective activity. For example, one journal assignment might ask them to share their thoughts and feelings on their service experiences, especially in light of Levinas’s notion of Metaphysical Desire.

We also use a significant portion of class time to reflect with one another. Sometimes, students engage in small group discussions about their work, usually concentrating on recognizing Levinasian ideas in their engagements. Another useful tool is the assigning of “service-pairs,” wherein two students are matched up for a month at a time to discuss their service-work, offer suggestions, and lend support where needed. And finally, we spend time in discussion as a class, seeking to make sense of the work we are doing, in light of Levinas’s theory. On international trips, nightly group reflections take the place of class discussion. In all of these activities, I offer guidance and suggestions to my students in order to help them to productively think through their experiences and ideas without merely falling back on preconceptions and pre-judgments.

I believe that my responsibility as the teacher of this course is two-fold, in the same sense in which the course itself has a two-fold purpose. I am responsible as a philosopher, a scholar, and a teacher to guide my students in the development of intellectual curiosity, rigor, insight, and judgment. This task demands the creation and discovery of knowledge within my students, through the establishment of a classroom environment that fosters genuine inquiry, dialogue, and meaning-making. I am also responsible as a member of the global community to seek ethical development and the cultivation of ethi-

cal responsibility and behavior in myself and others. Thus, the other important task I have is the fostering of ethical sensitivity and care among my students, for both their classmates and the larger local and global community.

In combining my endeavors to fulfill these responsibilities in my course, under the guidance of Levinas's theory, my main undertaking is to encourage my students to engage ethically with Others and carefully reflect upon what they experience and learn, without categorizing or reducing the individuals they encounter to stereotypes or preconceptions. As Levinas might explain it, I must expose them to the Saying, help them draw the Said out of their experiences, and remind them to always return to the Saying for a revision of their ideas, a challenge to their egoism, and a remembrance of the Other toward whom they should remain oriented. I must help them to find balance between the ethical experience of revelation and welcome and the rational movement to responsible judgment, decision-making, and action.

It is a fine line I have to walk with my students in our engagements and discussions, both individual and as a group. For Levinas, I must adopt an attitude or orientation of openness to each student's Otherness. At the same time that I am engaged in such ethical encounter with them, I must also perform the rational task of philosopher and educator. I must use the potential that lies in the reflective moment to gently guide each student toward paying very close attention to the ethical dimension of their interactions with their senior partners. I must ask them to reflect on this dimension and remember that the ethical relation transcends even that very reflection they pursue. To put it rather simply, I must remind them that Step Four of moral development—the reflective rational endeavor to understand—always requires a return to Steps One, Two, and Three. I must always return to the Other, to the suspension of the I's projects and ideas, and to the welcoming Desire for revelation.

Conclusion: Service Learning as Encounter with Others

I take Levinas's explanation of the ethical relation to be descriptive of the kind of engagement that goes beyond simply following the rules of society, fulfilling the dictates of the universal moral law, seeking to better one's own character, or calculating the lesser of two evils. I think that his explanation of ethics penetrates to the heart of what tends to be missing in our world today—that is, genuine care and concern for other individuals. As Levinas so eloquently puts it, “[i]n the exposure to wounds and outrages, in the feeling proper to responsibility, the oneself is provoked as irreplaceable, as devoted to others, without being able to resign, and thus as incarnated in order to offer

itself, to suffer, and to give.”⁵² If our endeavor as educators is to bring about awareness of what it means to live an ethical life, to cultivate sensitivity and concern for the suffering of others, and to encourage students to embark on a path of moral commitment and citizenship, I see no more valuable experience than that of service learning. It puts students into contact with those who suffer, who are the most reliable sources of information on ethical need. It forces students to call into question what they think they already know, and it reorients them toward a life of engagement with the community around them. Done the right way, service learning demands that they give their full attention not only to texts and abstract theories, but to the individuals who have something to reveal to them. And finally, students learn to judge very carefully and act for the good of those they serve, and always check back in with those individuals served to determine where their endeavors succeed or need revision.

This same ethical orientation toward Others should be reinforced in classroom discussion, in open and respectful dialogue with their fellow students. There, they will learn that even their classmates are experiencing their shared service experiences in ways that are radically different from one another. And they will learn that even those individuals with whom they can easily identify on a number of levels are also Others, who suffer and struggle, and deserve respect, attention, and care. I believe that education is not simply about acquiring a wealth of knowledge. If we want our students to not merely *study* ethical theory, but actually learn what it means to *be ethical*, then service learning experiences are much more than merely helpful. They are essential.

Notes

1. In focusing on need and suffering, I do not intend to suggest that all ethical relationships are predicated upon some sort of practical need or lacking. Levinas’s theory does not focus on the fulfillment of practical needs. I believe that *any encounter* with another person requires an ethical orientation. That orientation is a response to the Other’s need for my attention, for my respect, for my concern, for my non-indifference. *This* kind of need, I would argue, is *always*, already present in any encounter with another person. When this need is not met, the Other suffers.

2. Patrick Fitzgerald, “Service-Learning and the Socially Responsible Ethics Class,” *Teaching Philosophy* 20:3 (September 1997): 265.

3. This division of ethical development into four steps should not be understood to imply that a person rationally and consciously embarks on each step in the strict order that they are given. In fact, these steps often occur simultaneously, and act to reinforce each other, requiring a constant return to earlier steps as ethical responsibility develops.

4. In referencing these four articles, I do not intend to suggest that the authors are offering Levinasian claims. In fact, there are several ways in which these theories oppose

the Levinasian explanation of the ethical relation, some of which will be explained in due course. However, I do find elements within their arguments that can be interpreted as proper to the Levinasian explanation of ethical responsibility, and these are highlighted and explored.

5. Aristotle's "doctrine of the Mean" can be found in Book II of his *Nicomachean Ethics*.

6. Emmanuel Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 98.

7. This is why I use the term "Other" to speak of the other person. The capital "O" designates Levinas's notion of the other person as transcendent.

8. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: As Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1961) (hereafter cited as *TI*), 50–51 (emphasis his).

9. Levinas, *TI*, 77.

10. Stephen L. Esquith, "War, Political Violence, and Service Learning," *Teaching Philosophy* 23:3 (September 2000): 247. While there is much with which I strongly agree in Esquith's article, it should be noted that I do not concede that "applied ethics courses follow a fairly predictable trajectory from contemporary problems as different as brain death and the risk of a suspension bridge collapsing to moral judgments and back again" (243). He contrasts applied ethics courses, as interpreted in this way, with political philosophy courses, which "focus on the structure and limits of government that can make it a legitimate object of political loyalty" (243). He then offers his view that "political philosophy should enable students to recognize the origins, forms, and effects of violence in the political society they inhabit" (243). In my view, his reduction of applied ethics courses to "a fairly predictable trajectory" can be overcome if we recognize that a philosophically grounded applied ethics course can "focus on the structure and limits of [individuals]," and "enable students to recognize the origins, forms, and effects of violence in the [ethical] society they inhabit."

11. Sarah K. Donovan, "Teaching Philosophy Outside the Classroom: One Alternative to Service Learning," *Teaching Philosophy* 31:2 (June 2008): 171.

12. Of course, I have already discussed what we will be doing at the nursing home with the director of St. Joseph's Home for the Aged and the seniors who have volunteered for partnership.

13. In the past, I have relied on *Totality and Infinity* as the main Levinas text for the course. This has met with mixed response. Surely, it is the most thorough source for his early ideas on the ethical relation. The density of the text and language, however, presents significant difficulty for undergraduate students, resulting in sometimes counterproductive frustration and resistance to his theory. In the future, I will be a bit more selective in what we read out of *Totality and Infinity*, and I will supplement those readings with some of his articles and shorter pieces.

14. Levinas, *TI*, 37.

15. Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985) (hereafter cited as *E&I*), 60 (emphasis mine).

16. *Ibid.*

17. Donovan, "Teaching Philosophy Outside the Classroom," 173.

18. H. M. Geibel, "In Defense of Service Learning," *Teaching Philosophy* 29:2 (June 2006): 101.

19. Levinas, *TI*, 204.
20. Donovan, "Teaching Philosophy Outside the Classroom," 167, 171.
21. *Ibid.*, 171.
22. *Ibid.*, 168.
23. Esquith, "War, Political Violence, and Service Learning," 248.
24. Fitzgerald, "Service-Learning and the Socially Responsible Ethics Class," 262.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Levinas, *E&I*, 89.
27. Levinas, *TI*, 65–66.
28. Levinas, *TI*, 33 (emphasis mine).
29. Levinas, *E&I*, 91 (emphasis mine).
30. Emmanuel Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence*, trans. Michael B. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 30.
31. Levinas, *TI*, 51.
32. Fitzgerald, "Service-Learning and the Socially Responsible Ethics Class," 254.
33. *Ibid.*, 260.
34. Geibel, "In Defense of Service Learning," 102.
35. Esquith, "War, Political Violence, and Service Learning," 251.
36. Geibel, "In Defense of Service Learning," 103.
37. Levinas, *TI*, 194.
38. Levinas, *TI*, 199–200.
39. Levinas, *TI*, 200.
40. Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981) (hereafter cited as *OB*), 46.
41. Emmanuel Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas," conducted by Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison Ainley, trans. Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright, in *The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other*, ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988), 174.
42. Levinas, *E&I*, 90.
43. Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality," 179 (emphasis mine).
44. Levinas, *E&I*, 90.
45. Levinas, *OB*, 157.
46. Levinas, *Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other*, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 107.
47. Levinas, *OB*, 46–47.
48. *Ibid.*, 47.
49. Donovan, "Teaching Philosophy Outside the Classroom," 171–72.
50. Geibel, "In Defense of Service Learning," 101.
51. Fitzgerald, "Service-Learning and the Socially Responsible Ethics Class," 257.
52. Levinas, *OB*, 105.